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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-4072 
____________ 
 
THURMAN MEARIN, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI, ROBERT B. 
MACINTYRE; SUSAN COWAN; ROBERT DIETZ; 
MIKE IVAN; MAJOR LORINDA WINFIELD; LT. E.  
GREGO; LT. ROBERT L. KENNEDY; LT. S.P. DURCO;   
WALLACE DITTSWORTH; CARLA SWARTZ;  
PAUL PALYA; DORINA VARNER; M. DIALESANDOR;  
DR. YANAKS; DAN DAVIS; SGT. YOUNKIN; COL.  
WILCHER; COL. MARTAIN; COL. GIFFORD; COL.  
MOORE; COL. HARKLEROAD; LT. D. MITCHELL;  
COL. W. SHAWLEY; COL. KNIGHT; COL. BARCHIESI;  
PETE VIDONISH; F.NUNEZ; COL. A. SHAWLEY 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-00571) 
District Judge: Nora B. Fischer 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 16, 2014 
 
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: January 28, 2014 ) 
____________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Thurman Mearin, a state prisoner, appeals from an order of the District 
Court granting summary judgment to the defendants.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm. 
 Mearin, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution in Greene, Pennsylvania 
(“SCI-Greene”), filed a civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against numerous 
correctional defendants, alleging several violations of his constitutional rights.  In the 
main, Mearin claimed that the defendants were engaging in a campaign of harassment in 
retaliation for his having filed lawsuits and grievances.  Discovery ensued, and the 
defendants deposed Mearin.  Following the close of discovery, the defendants moved for 
summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a).  After Mearin submitted his brief in 
opposition to summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge recommended that summary 
judgment be awarded to the defendants.  With respect to Mearin’s overarching claim that 
he was being retaliated against in numerous ways for exercising his First Amendment 
rights, the Magistrate Judge concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to whether there was a causal connection between the exercise of Mearin’s 
constitutional rights and the alleged adverse actions.  The Magistrate Judge, citing Lauren 
W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007), specifically noted 
that there was no temporal proximity between Mearin’s protected activity and the alleged 
adverse actions taken by certain specific defendants, and thus no suggestion of a 
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retaliatory motive.  Mearin then submitted objections to the Report and 
Recommendation, in which he discussed his claims that the defendants had attempted to 
starve him while he was in disciplinary custody, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; 
that he was deprived of his right to call a witness and to make use of a security videotape 
in defense of a false misconduct charge, in violation of procedural due process; that he 
had been improperly deprived of “Z,” or single cell, status; and that his prison records 
had been falsified to keep him in “H,” or high-security status.  In an order entered on 
September 23, 2013, the District Court awarded summary judgment to the defendants, 
adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the Court. 
 Mearin appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk granted 
him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was subject to 
summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third 
Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Mearin has moved for appointment of counsel on appeal.   
 We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Summary 
judgment is proper where the summary judgment record “shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a).  A genuine issue of material fact is one that could change 
the outcome of the litigation.   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 
(1986).   The moving parties have the initial burden of identifying evidence that they 
believe shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  Moreover, we are required to view the facts in the light most 
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favorable to the non-moving party, and make all reasonable inferences in his favor.  See 
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994).  Ultimately, however, 
“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).   
As an initial matter, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that there was no 
evidence to show that Mearin’s protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor 
in any of the alleged “adverse” actions taken by the defendants (which included falsifying 
his records and issuing false misconducts, among other things).  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 
F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001).  There was no evidence whatever in the summary judgment 
record of a causal connection between the defendants’ various decisions and Mearin’s 
prior lawsuits.  See DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267 (to establish causal connection, plaintiff 
must prove either a suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 
allegedly retaliatory action, or a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a 
causal link).      
 Independent of his claim of retaliation, Mearin claimed that the defendants starved 
him as a form of punishment, while he was in disciplinary custody, by serving him only 
half portions of the institution’s 2579-2700 calorie diet.  As  a result, he lost 18 pounds 
from approximately February 19, 2010 to May 4, 2010.  Several inmates submitted 
statements corroborating Mearin’s claim of inadequate food for those in disciplinary 
custody.  Correctional officials who are deliberately indifferent to the basic human needs 
of inmates violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
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punishment.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  They are liable in a civil rights 
action if they deprive an inmate of life’s basic necessities, such as food, clothing, and 
shelter.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984).  In moving for summary 
judgment, the defendants flatly denied that inmates in disciplinary custody, including 
Mearin, are deprived of half the calories the institution normally provides to the general 
population.  Moreover, the defendants asserted that the meals they offer to inmates in 
disciplinary custody are nutritionally adequate.   
We have reviewed the summary judgment record, and even considered those 
exhibits Mearin submitted with his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report.  Mearin is 
over six feet tall, and he weighed 179.5 lbs. on October 16, 2008.  At that time, he was 
receiving a snack bag along with his evening medication.  We note that, in arguing for 
single-cell status, Mearin disclosed that he is HIV+ and suffers from hepatitis C.  On 
April 15, 2009, Mearin weighed 182 lbs.  On April 27, 2010, Mearin weighed only 160 
lbs.  Accordingly, the summary judgment record shows that he suffered a weight loss.  
But, by his own admission, prison officials responded to his weight loss; Mearin was seen 
by a physician who responded to his condition by ordering an enhanced snack bag, which 
provided an additional 900-1000 calories daily to Mearin’s prison diet.  By May 6, 2011, 
Mearin’s weight was back up to 183 lbs.   
The Magistrate Judge reasoned, and we agree, that there was thus no triable Eighth 
Amendment issue because no evidence showed that the defendants acted with a 
sufficiently culpable state of mind, that is, with deliberate indifference to Mearin’s basic 
needs.  The summary judgment record shows that Mearin suffers from debilitating 
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illnesses and that his arguably precipitous weight loss was evaluated by prison staff and 
properly treated.  His allegation that his weight loss should be blamed on the defendants 
retaliatory desire to starve him is not supported by any evidence in the summary 
judgment record, and thus the defendants were entitled to summary judgment, Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 56(e)(3).  It is certainly true, as Mearin argues, that credibility determinations 
on material issues cannot be made in the context of a motion for summary judgment, see 
Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 
(3d Cir. 1993).  Moreover, fellow inmates stated, in support of Mearin’s claim, that the 
amount of food they receive in disciplinary custody is very small or half of what the 
general population receives, although they did not state that they too had lost weight.  
But, in opposing summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply 
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co., 475 U.S. at 586.  Here, even with the inmate’s affidavits, a jury would have had an 
insufficient evidentiary basis from which to find that the defendants were deliberately 
starving Mearin because his weight loss does not indicate that he was starving.  In 
addition, he suffers from a chronic illness, and he offered no medical evidence to show 
that his weight loss was caused by the prison diet and was not instead a result of a disease 
process.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (plaintiff cannot rest on his allegations without any 
significant probative evidence tending to support his claim). 
 Turning to Mearin’s remaining claims, he alleged that he was not allowed to call 
his witness at one of his misconduct hearings, and that he was entitled to review a 
security videotape which he believes would have exonerated him of the charge against 
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him.  As explained by the Magistrate Judge, an inmate’s procedural due process rights, 
including his right to call a witness, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), 
are only triggered where the prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 
472, 484 (1995).  Mearin’s disciplinary confinement of 90 days on one occasion and 60 
days on another did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship.  Therefore, his 
liberty interests were not implicated and his right to the procedures set forth in Wolff was 
not triggered.   
 Mearin also raised two claims concerning his custody status.  He claimed that, 
because he suffers from two different infectious diseases, and because an infectious 
disease is a basis for a single cell under the prison’s own policy, the defendants violated 
his constitutional rights by failing to give him “Z” or single cell status.  He claimed that 
he once had “Z” status and that the defendants altered his institutional records to conceal 
that fact.  Mearin also claimed that the defendants falsified his institutional records to 
reflect that his escape conviction was more recent than it really is, and thus no legitimate 
(in his opinion) reason to subject him to “H” or level 4 security status.  The defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment on these claims.  The Supreme Court has held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not give a prisoner a liberty interest in a particular 
housing location or custody level while under the jurisdiction of correctional authorities.  
Meachum v. Fano, U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 
(1976); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).  With respect to Mearin’s specific 
health issues, the summary judgment record establishes that, although the defendants 
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could have given Mearin a single cell under the existing policy, they carefully reviewed 
his positive institutional history
1
 and determined that there was no need to place him in a 
single cell even though he is HIV+ and suffers from hepatitis C.  There was thus no 
evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  See White 
v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to the defendants.  Mearin’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied.  
                                              
1
 Mearin does not deny that he has lived with cellmates without any noteworthy issues for 
a significant period of time. 
